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Summary: 
The aim of this chapter is to describe how the macroeconomic development path taken by the 
Visegrad countries affects the internationalisation process of their domestic companies. The 
macroeconomic development paths are derived with the FOI model (focusing on the future, outside 
and inside potentials of the developed economies). The FOI-indices are calculated for all 34 OECD 
members, and then a factor and cluster analysis is conducted, with the help of which it is identified 
that the Visegrad countries have all chosen an outward focused development path. This development 
path involves the heavy reliance on outside resources, and forces the domestic firms to face tough 
international competition even in local markets. The outward focus of a country’s development 
strategy therefore should help local enterprises in becoming more competitive. Yet, this strategy 
usually result in a dual structure, where a good portion of the local businesses are characterised with 
a low level of competitiveness, and have very little chance of going international. 
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3.1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
The transition period of the 1990s has brought a difficult economic policy dilemma 
for the Visegrad countries, as they had to choose a new development path for their 
economies. Some elements of the transition were obvious (liberalisation of markets, 
deregulation etc.), but in many respects these countries could have had the option 
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to take their own path toward the market economy and development. As there are 
clear trade-offs among key development factors (e.g. low wages offer short term 
competitiveness edges in global markets, but they limit the possibility of consumers 
to invest in goods and services that help in creating value over the long run), the 
Visegrad countries had to make important long term commitments. 
It was established based on an FOI model analysis that there are indeed several 
distinctive development paths even among the most developed economies (namely 
the OECD countries). Interestingly enough all four Visegrad countries have taken 
the same route, namely a development model that we call the outward focused 
development path. Although there are significant differences among them, some 
common keys characteristics distinguish the Visegrad countries (and some other 
OECD members) from the other groups of developed countries. These common 
characteristics include the extreme openness of their economies, the excessive reliance 
of outside resources (capital and technology), policies that favour foreign direct 
investors, a dual economic and social structure. The outward focus affects local 
corporations as much as foreign ones. Due to the openness of their economies, local 
corporations have to face fierce international competition even in domestic markets. 
This feature is directly linked to the internationalisation process of local corporations, 
as the high level of openness means that from a competitiveness point of view many 
local firms face similar challenges in both domestic and international markets. 
This chapter contains four major parts. The theoretical and methodological 
background of the FOI model is presented first, then the FOI-indices are calculated 
for the Visegrad countries. Based on a factor and a cluster analysis the typical 
development paths within the OECD are presented as a third step. Finally the main 
characteristics and policy implications of the outward focused development path are 
discussed in detail. 
3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Growth and development are mentioned almost as synonyms in this paper, although 
the literature usually addresses them separately. The simplest approach is to say that 
growth is the narrower, and development is the more complex class, as growth is 
usually defined as an increase in certain quantitative variables, while development 
describes a process of moving from a lower level of quality to a higher one (Szentes, 
2011). As the measurement of the phenomena economics usually deals with is 
problematic anyway, the most popular, formalised growth models (e.g. Domar, 
1947, Harrod, 1948, Solow, 1956, Romer, 1986, Lucas, 1988) concentrate on the 
national income or on its per capita version. These models therefore map the 
problem of growth/development through the quantitative change of a single 
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indicator, so they offer tools to analyse the problem of growth, the narrower 
category. 
The GDP however – being an aggregate indicator – veils more profound 
processes that are crucial for development, such as the structure of the economic 
system, changes in employment, income distribution or the institutional framework, 
etc. For this reason, from now on, we will use the more complex approach to 
development whenever we touch upon issues of growth and/or development paths, 
factors of growth and/or development, meaning that we interpret development as 
a combination of two things: growth in the indicators of national income, and the 
modernising of the socioeconomic structures. 
Theories of Development 
The different schools of economics have had different views on the rules of the 
economy, and they do not agree on the basic assumptions either; hence, a wide 
variety of theories have been developed over the centuries. While most schools 
implicitly assume that the models used are universal, List (1841) was convinced that 
the classical theories may only apply to the most developed economies; the followers 
of new institutionalism (for example see Williamson, 2000) point out that the 
institutional structure of different countries can be very different. A similar 
confrontation can be observed regarding the development paths. It is widely accepted 
that development is unilinear, meaning that all countries have to go through the 
same development stages (with timing being the only difference among them). 
Veblen (1919) on the other hand argued against the teleological approach 
of economics, and suggested an evolutionary one instead. 
It worth mentioning that mainstream theories do not consider the effects of 
national interests and bargaining power in their models; heterodox schools on the 
other hand cannot accept the independent development of countries (although there 
is no agreement among them considering the exact nature of the interdependencies). 
It may seem natural to choose the countries and national economies as the unit of 
analysis; Wallerstein (1974), however, when describing the economic history 
of medieval Europe, concludes that modernisation cannot be understood within 
the national economy framework. He chooses the world system as the unit of 
analysis instead. 
Some scholars have developed models with few explanatory factors; others have 
gone for more variables. The well-known growth theories pick one or two variables; 
Porter’s diamond model (1990) combines four quite complex factors; the empirical 
study of Barro (1998) of 100 countries spanning over 30 years finds seven factors 
that are strongly connected to the growth rate of the real GDP. 
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The factors of development identified in the economics literature can be 
categorised along many principles, but the location of factors is probably the most 
important division line. One camp of economists traces back differences in economic 
development to reasons that can be found inside the country. They point to factors 
whose presence (e.g. physical or human capital) or lack (e.g. government failures) 
enables high growth rates. Another group of economists finds the causes of 
underdevelopment in outside factors. Usually these theories take the differences in 
the development level as given in the world economy, and they assume that these 
differences lead to asymmetric dependencies. The asymmetric dependencies on the 
other hand make it very difficult for underdeveloped countries to catch up with the 
rich world. The inside-outside distinction among the factors of development plays 
a crucial role in the model developed during our research. 
The Inside Factors of Development 
Adam Smith (1776) saw the division of labour as the main source of wealth. The 
countries that are able to extend the division of labour among their firms and citizens 
can become wealthier, as they are able to produce a higher quantity with the same 
labour input. The main finding of the Harrod–Domar model (1947, 1948) is that 
investments are the key to economic growth. Investments on the other hand are 
mainly dependent on the savings rate. Around a decade later Solow (1956) pointed 
out that investments and savings cannot contribute to growth in the long run. In his 
view, long-term economic growth is driven by technical change. 
Keynes (1936) suggested crises are generated by limits in demand, and the latter 
may be strengthened by large income differences. The speculative demand for money 
of those who are well off can be especially high, which prevents a substantial part of 
the income from turning into effective market demand. Inequalities in income 
distribution thus can be a setback for balanced growth. 
Schumpeter (1934) stressed that cyclical fluctuations should be regarded as 
a natural part of the economy, as entrepreneurs may only draw profits if they break 
the status quo of equilibrium. The way to break the status quo is through innovation, 
which therefore becomes the primary driver of the cyclical development. McClelland 
(1957) also emphasised the importance of the entrepreneurial class. In his view 
entrepreneurs are the pioneers of development, and their biggest motivator is not 
profit, but the achievement of some special goals (N-achievement). 
When the big colonial empires collapsed, several academics explained the 
situation of the underdeveloped former colonies with a value system and social 
structure that was different from the Western one. In underdeveloped countries the 
rural characteristics of the society are dominant, meaning that labour is inefficient, 
immobile, the social structure is rigid, and the general attitude rejects individualism 
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and risk taking (Meier, 1964). When local values confront the Western values, the 
society is split into two groups, and a dual social structure is formed (Boeke, 1953), 
which is completed with a dual economic structure as well (where the traditional and 
modern sectors are insulated from each other). 
The role of human capital in growth and development is highlighted in various 
forms in the literature. Szentes (2011) quotes from A. Marshall: from a national 
perspective the capital invested in workers’ children is just as productive as capital 
invested in horses or machinery. Newer theories unquestionably suggest that capital 
invested in children is far more productive than that invested in horses and 
machinery. Endogenous growth theories see increasing returns as a prime source 
of long- term growth, and they directly or indirectly explain increasing returns with 
human capital. Lucas (1988) treats human capital as a reproducible one, an element 
of capital that the society is able to broaden at a constant rate. The expansion of 
human capital, on the other hand, leads to a constant increase in the productivity of 
the physical capital. Romer (1986) also can be connected to human capital. In his 
model, investments made in research and development produce positive externalities 
that enable a constant increase in the productivity of physical capital. 
Veblen (1919) points out that human behaviour is deeply affected by 
institutionalised rules of society. His views were taken over by new institutional 
economists (e.g. North, 1993; Williamson, 1998). According to them institutions 
affect the incentive system of an economy, while the incentive system on the other 
hand influences the behaviour, size and competition of firms, the level of investments 
and technological development, and so, ultimately the level of development of an 
economy. Underdevelopment thus is explained by institutional frameworks 
consisting of bad incentives, according to the new institutional school. 
Partially connected to the institutional approach is the theory of government 
failures, which was mainly brought into the attention of development experts by 
Tullock (1993). It was back in the 1960s when Tullock suggested (1967) that the 
super profit that monopolistic structures offer can be an incentive for firms to lobby 
for government regulations granting monopolistic positions and monopoly profits. 
According to calculations made by Krueger (1974), the rent seeking behaviour of 
firms in the field of import licences caused a 7.3% GDP loss in India, and a 15% 
GDP loss In Turkey in 1964. The more corrupt a country is, the weaker the state is, 
the heavier the costs of rent seeking are, and so rent seeking can be one of the major 
obstacles of economic development. 
Porter’s (1990) national competitiveness theory adds some highly complex 
factors to the literature of economic development. A somewhat similar idea is 
suggested by Freeman (1987), who developed the theory of national innovation 
systems. These systems are centred around cooperation among businesses, the 
education system and the research infrastructure. 
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The Outside Factors of Development 
The theory of comparative advantage developed by Ricardo (1817) had become one 
of the cornerstones of the laissez-faire approach of international relations. According 
to Ricardo the highest welfare level can only be ensured if trade is conducted along 
the lines of comparative advantages, and there is a free flow of goods. This free trade 
principle was questioned by many. List (1841) argued against laissez-faire. He 
defended protectionism, and suggested protective tariffs for newly established 
industries (the infant industry argument). His suggestions echoed those of Alexander 
Hamilton (1791) made in the newly formed USA. 
After the Second World War the focus of development economics shifted 
towards the power relations of different countries. Prebisch (1964) and Myrdal 
(1957) point out that underdeveloped states are dependent on richer countries, and 
so the current system of international division of labour is not based on comparative 
advantages. The internal economic structures of most of the developing countries are 
directly influenced by the developed ones through the colonial system (Myrdal: 
forced bilateralism). Balogh (1963) argues that as a result of power inequalities 
among parties, the economic structure of the developing countries has to be adjusted 
time after time to the changes generated by technical progress made in the developed 
economies, and the adjustment process prevents them from achieving long-term 
growth. The dependency relations lead to one-track specialisation (Singer 1964). The 
majority of exports of the developing countries are primary products and 
commodities, which leads to a decrease in the terms of trade over the long run. 
Bhagwati in his 1958 paper titled “Immiserizing growth” showed that the decrease in 
terms of trade can result in a decrease in the national income even if there is dynamic 
growth in the production of the export sector. One lesson learned from the literature 
of interdependencies is that a diversified export structure can be an important 
development factor. 
Emmanuel (1972) has gone as far as claiming that trade between developing 
and developed countries is an unequal exchange, which is a manifestation of the 
imperialism of trade. Unequal exchange was triggered by wage differences, and 
is sustained by the immobility of labour. Wallerstein (1974) also accepted the 
concept of unequal exchange, though he argued that it is a result of the different 
bargaining power of nations. The core-periphery relations and the geographical 
position basically predestine the fate of nations, according to Wallerstein. 
As the role played by transnational companies in the international flow of goods 
and capital became more and more dominant, a great deal of attention was directed 
towards them. Furtado (1970) suggested that the most important development factor 
is not the interdependencies among countries any more, but the investment strategies 
of transnational companies. Transnational companies can bring capital to a country, 
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creating jobs, but the newly formed subsidiaries may be isolated from the local 
economy (Singer, 1964). The ability of a country to attract foreign capital, especially 
if the capital is invested in fields that can fit in well to the current economic structure 
of the economy, is another important development factor. 
Table 3.1. Inside and outside development factors 
Inside factors Outside factors 
Division of labour  (Smith) 
Free trade – international division of labour 
(Ricardo) 
Savings rate (Harrod-Domar) 
Abundance-scarcity of capital 
Protectionism 
Defence of infant industries (List) 
Equal-unequal income distribution 
(Keynes) 
Equal or unequal trade partners (Balogh) 
Pressure to fit to modern patterns (Balogh) 
Drive to innovate (Schumpeter) 
Unilateral dependency - diversification 
(Myrdal) 
Entrepreneurial behaviour (McClelland) One-sided specialisation (Singer) 
Rigid-flexible social structure (Meier) 
Imported or organically developed social 
structures (Boeke) 
Immiserising growth – terms of trade 
(Bhagwati) 
Forced bilateralism (Myrdal) 
Dual-homogeneous economic structures 
(Meier) 
International wage division- mobility of 
labour (Emmanuel) 
Investments into human capital (Marshall) 
Human capital, as a renewable resource 
(Lucas) 
Positive externalities of R&D (Romer) 
Geographical position – core and periphery 
(Wallerstein) 
Institutional incentives (North) 
Path-dependent development 
Investment strategies of multinational 
companies (Furtado) 
Government failure (Tullock) 
Rent-seeking (Krueger) 
Demonstration effect National diamond (Porter) 
Innovation systems (Freeman) 
Rule of law, democracy (Barro) 
Source: own study. 
 
 
The demonstration effects of modern consumer societies are worth mentioning, too. 
Generally the consumers of the developing countries try to follow the consumption 
patterns of the developed nations. This usually has a cut-down effect on local growth, 
as the goods fitting to the most current consumption trends are generally produced 
overseas, so following the trends increases imports, and can contribute to the trade 
balance deficit. 
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The Role of Institutions in Development 
According to the followers of the institutional school, institutions affect human 
behaviour, in other words they influence the decisions of economic agents. Veblen 
was the first to point that out (1919), and also added that it is an oversimplification 
to assume that market decisions can be analysed independently from any other 
outside factors, like family, culture, community, politics, etc. His views were 
neglected by mainstream economics, but the topic was brought into the forefront 
again by two new research agendas. 
On the one hand it was proved by a series of psychological experiments that we 
are not capable of making such rational decisions as is assumed by economics. The 
notion of homo economicus was debunked by the theory of bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1957). Agents with bounded rationality behave opportunistically. On the 
other hand Coase’s pioneering article (Coase, 1937) shed light on the fact that the 
transactions conducted among agents are not frictionless, and depending on the rate 
of frictions, very different market solutions may prove to be the most efficient ones. 
If we take a closer look at market transactions, it becomes clear that there are 
numerous social phenomena that are disregarded by mainstream economics, yet they 
influence the opportunistic behaviour of market agents and the rate of frictions 
during transactions. These social phenomena are collectively called institutions. 
Hodgson defines institutions (2006) as systems of established and prevalent social 
rules that structure social interactions. According to the definition above, language, 
money, etiquette, the measurement system, and firms can all be regarded as 
institutions. Institutions make it easier to calculate and forecast the behaviour of 
agents, thus they contribute to the decrease of uncertainty and frictions during 
transactions. North (1993) offers a similar definition of institutions: institutions are 
the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction.  
Institutions have proved especially important in the transition process of the 
Visegrad countries, as we have all learnt it during the last two decades. A transition to 
the market economy without the proper market institutions can lead to chaotic 
conditions, and to a drop in economic efficiency (compared to countries with a long 
market economy history). That is why adopting the best practices of more successful 
economies rarely yield the expected returns. 
Williamson (1998) suggested a hierarchy that proved very useful during our 
analysis. He separated social analysis into four levels (Figure 3.1). The different levels 
are ranked according to the time needed to change them, but they also show what 
influences what in the society. Higher levels directly influence the level just below 
them, meaning that no practices may be adopted on the lower levels that are not 
compatible with the superior levels. 
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Level Frequency (years) Purpose 
102 - 103 
10 - 102 
1 - 10 
continuous 
Often noncalculative, 
spontaneous 
Get the institutional 
environment right 
1st-order economizing 
Get the governance structures 
right 
2nd-order economizing 
Get the marginal conditions 
right 
3rd-order economizing 
L1 
L2 
L3 
L4 
Embeddedness:  
informal institutions, 
customs, traditions, 
norms, religion 
Governance: play of the 
game – esp. contract 
(aligning governance 
structures with 
transactions) 
Resource allocation and 
employment 
(prices and quantities, 
incentive alignment) 
Institutional 
environment: formal 
rules of the game – esp. 
property (polity, 
judiciary, bureaucracy) 
 
Figure 3.1. Economics of institutions 
Source: Williamson (1998, p. 26). 
Social embeddedness is on top of the hierarchy (L1). Williamson puts norms, 
customs, ethical principles, traditions, conventions and religion into this category. 
Some development factors found in the literature at least partly belong to this level 
(e.g. the dual structure of the society, entrepreneurial behaviour). 
The institutional environment forms the second level (L2). While the informal 
rules were placed in Level 1, the rules of L2 are formal, codified ones 
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(e.g. constitution, laws, property rights). Although the change of Level 2 rules is also 
partly evolutionary in nature, calculated interference is also possible on this level 
(unlike on L1). Such interferences are called first-order economising, which is about 
finding the ideal combination of formal rules. Many of the development factors 
belong to the institutional environment: the rule of law, democratic rights, market 
regulation and protectionism. 
First-order economising, however, does not ensure the optimal economic 
structure. As agents behave opportunistically, they do not keep the formal rules of 
the economy all the time. Jurisdiction has also got its frictions, meaning that those 
who follow the rules are not able to enforce their rights against the opportunists 
instantly and without any costs. This is where the third level (L3) kicks in, called 
governance by Williamson. The unit of analysis in governance is the transactions 
made among economic agents, and the contracts mediating those transactions. Such 
development factors as the coordination of education and research, Porter’s national 
diamond, government failures or rent seeking, can all be reckoned among L3 items. 
The final level (L4) is concerned with the allocation of resources, an area which is 
traditionally addressed by neoclassical economics. The factors of the better-known 
growth theories (quantities of labour and capital, savings, investments, etc.) all 
belong to this level. 
Williams thinks that new institutional economics addresses problems belonging 
mainly to Levels 2 and 3. North’s and Hodgson’s definitions cited above, however, 
suggest that all phenomena belonging to L1, L2 and L3 can be regarded as 
institutions. This paper therefore treats all factors as institutional factors that can be 
categorised in one of the top three levels of Williamson’s hierarchy. 
3.3. MATERIAL AND METHODS 
Structure of the Model 
The original idea behind the FOI model was to identify the crucial development 
factors of Hungary, but potential development paths detected with the method apply 
to all OECD countries. The model is primarily based on the factors collected from 
the literature, but these factors are structured in a unique way which allows us to 
draw up characteristic development paths that can be clearly separated from each 
other. We used the following assumptions when the FOI model was set up: 
− National economies are the unit of our analysis; international interdependencies 
are mostly disregarded in the paper. 
− The key to development is not a single factor, but rather a combination of many 
factors. According to our assumption there are several important motors of 
development; sometimes these factors do influence each other, and it is very 
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difficult to determine what causes what, still they can be equally important, and 
they all have to be used to draw up a potential development path for the Visegrad 
countries. 
− Among the many factors considered in the model, the so-called institutional 
factors play a primary role. Institutional factors are detected using the hierarchy 
put forward by Williamson (1998). In fact the model was developed with the aim 
of stressing the importance of institutional factors in development. 
− Development can take more than one shape and form. There are several feasible 
development paths, and the Viosegrad countries are not constrained to only one of 
them, but may choose from a (limited) number of such paths. To determine these 
development paths, the FOI model was used to test the OECD countries. 
The FOI model offers a new typology of development factors, but it is also capable of 
structuring these factors along three clear directions of development. As shown 
previously, the inside-outside typology of development factors is a standard part of 
the literature. The FOI model, however, is based on a three-dimensional structure. 
These three dimensions are: 
− F, i.e. the future potential of a country, 
− O, i.e. the outside potential of a country, 
− I, i.e. the inside potential of a country. 
All three dimensions are complex, composed of a large scale of factors. Yet they can 
still be clearly distinguished from each other, which is useful because the clear 
distinction can help in the formulation of distinctive development strategies.  
The future potential includes factors that are regarded to be crucial for the 
sustainability and future competitiveness of an economy. As sustainability has 
become one of the main paradigms of all social sciences, we felt that the inclusion of 
it as a separate development dimension was essential. In our case sustainability 
translates to ensuring that the typical signs and indicators of a developed country 
characterise not only the current state of the economy but also the relatively distant 
future. 
The outside potential includes factors that are crucial to the current world 
market position of an economy. This second dimension can be treated as an 
equivalent of the outside factors listed based on the literature. Some of the elements 
of the outside potential may not be influenced from the inside; others, like the 
conditions affecting the international flow of goods, services and factors of 
production, are a standard part of economic policy. 
The inside potential is made up of factors that are regarded to be crucial to the 
current well-being and development of a developed economy. Most of the inside 
factors listed in Table 3.1 fall into this potential. Countries that offer favourable 
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conditions to local entrepreneurs, and provide a high level of quality of life to their 
inhabitants, can have remarkable inside potential. 
It is not difficult to spot that certain trade-offs exist among the three potentials. 
Higher wage levels, for example, are absolutely favourable from the perspective of the 
inside potential, but they can be dangerous for the outside potential of the country. 
They can also be threatening to the future potential, if the result of a high wage level 
is overconsumption. If a country is well endowed with natural resources, this can 
boost its inside and outside potentials, but the abundance of resources usually leads 
to high proportions of waste, which again harms the future potential. The three 
potentials were drafted with these trade-offs in mind. 
Formulating a Measurement Method 
During a brainstorming session a list of 50 indicators was compiled with the help of 
experts. These 50 indicators were chosen to measure the relevant development 
factors, and they were all included in a questionnaire.  
Table 3.2. The components of the future, outside and inside potentials 
Future potential Outside potential Inside potential 
Social responsibility (L1-3) Trade to GDP ratio (L3-4) Burden of government 
regulation (L2-3) 
Industrial disputes (L1) Country credit rating (L4) Quality of life (L4) 
Energy infrastructure (L3) Exchange rate stability (L3) Collected total tax revenues 
(L3) 
Total public expenditure on 
education per capita (L3) 
Financial institutions' 
transparency (L3) 
Pension funding (L2-3) 
Ageing of society (L1-2) English proficiency (L4) GDP (PPP) per capita (L4) 
Renewable energies (L3)  Real GDP Growth (L4) 
Healthy life expectancy (L3)  Ease of access to loans (L3) 
Ecological footprint (L1-2)  Rigidity of employment (L3) 
Total expenditure on R&D 
per capita (L3) 
 Labour force (L4) 
Total R&D personnel 
nationwide per capita (L3) 
 Skilled labour (L3) 
Educational assessment / 
Mathematics (L3) 
  
The final version of the model was fine-tuned using the statistical data of the OECD countries 
Source: own study. 
Experts were asked to rank all 50 indicators on a 1-7 scale (1=not relevant at all; 
7= of highest significance). Each indicator received three separate scores: one for 
future potential, one for outside potential and one for inside potential. 
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The respondents had to give a high score to an indicator if they believed it greatly 
contributed to the sustainability and future competitiveness (F potential), current 
world market position (O potential) or current well-being (I potential) of Hungary. 
The questionnaire was completed by 28 experts. Most of them were active members 
of the Committee on Future Research of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
Representing several academic fields (arts, engineering, medicine, natural and social 
sciences), they offered a wide perspective and a strong future-oriented attitude, values 
that are highly useful in this kind of research. 
During the processing of the questionnaires every indicator was placed in the 
group (F, O or I potential) where it scored highest, meaning that an indicator could 
only be part of one of the potentials. In order to eliminate some of the less important 
factors (which received low scores in all three dimensions), we disregarded everything 
that had a score below average. The final transformation left us with 27 factors: 12 of 
them influence the future potential, 10 the inside and 5 the outside potential 
(Table 3.2). 
3.4. THE FOI ANALYSIS OF THE OECD COUNTRIES 
To quantify the future, outside and inside potentials, the FOI-indices were 
calculated. The value of the 27 components (listed in Table 3.2) were gathered for all 
34 OECD members for the year 2010, and then all values were transformed  
to a 1-7 scale using the min-max method. By averaging the standardised values, we 
were able to calculate the F-, O- and I-indices of all 34 countries (Table 3.3). 
Factor Analysis 
In order to better understand, what background factors drive the value of the 
different F-, O- and I-indices, a factor analysis was conducted with SPSS 19. Almost 
150 variables were tested during the analysis. In the first step, we checked how 
closely related those variables are to the three index values in the OECD countries, 
and what the direction of the relationship is. As a second step, all variables were only 
considered in the factor analysis of the index they had the highest correlational 
relationship with. 
We were able to establish three main groups of indicators that showed 
a significant correlation with the index of the future potential of the OECD 
countries. They were labelled Human capital, Accountable corporations and Quality 
of the education system. The Human capital factor is a combination of indicators 
measuring the education and health sectors, and the productivity. The Accountable 
corporations factor combines such factors as the ethical and social responsibility 
of organisations and the credibility of managers, and so it represents the social, 
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ethical and environmental considerations of businesses. The third factor, Quality 
of education system, shows the returns on efforts made in the education system. 
Table 3.3. The F-, O- and I-indices of the OECD countries 
Country F O I  Country F O I 
Australia 4.20 5.32 4.35 Japan 4.80 3.68 4.01 
Austria 4.70 5.41 4.05 South Korea 4.00 4.26 3.33 
Belgium 3.90 5.56 3.47 Luxembourg 5.30 6.56 4.45 
Canada 3.90 5.41 4.50 Mexico 2.70 3.98 2.85 
Chile 3.80 5.03 4.13 Netherlands 4.40 5.54 3.83 
Czech Republic 3.10 4.97 3.57 New Zealand 4.20 4.52 4.00 
Denmark 4.80 5.77 4.30 Norway 5.20 5.70 4.13 
Estonia 3.00 4.94 3.08 Poland 2.90 4.42 3.07 
Finland 5.00 5.72 4.02 Portugal 3.50 4.33 2.91 
France 4.40 4.46 3.04 Slovakia 3.00 4.82 3.25 
Germany  4.30 5.26 3.73 Slovenia 3.40 5.08 2.70 
Greece  2.90 3.66 2.50 Spain 3.40 4.23 2.99 
Hungary 2.90 4.56 2.55 Sweden  5.10 5.22 4.13 
Iceland 5.90 2.33 4.42 Switzerland 5.40 5.37 4.89 
Ireland 3.90 4.17 3.91 Turkey 3.30 3.63 3.14 
Israel 3.60 4.89 4.13 United Kingdom 3.90 4.35 3.60 
Italy 3.50 3.82 2.66 USA 3.80 4.27 4.47 
Source: own study. 
Two factors were found with the factor analysis of the O-index, namely 
National goodwill and Investment conditions. The main distinction between the two 
factors is the time frame within which their indicators may be influenced by the 
decision maker. The Investment conditions factor includes variables that can 
be influenced relatively easily, even over the short term; the National goodwill on the 
other hand may only be changed over the very long term. 
Variables having a significant correlation with the I-index can be separated into 
three factors. These factors were labelled Business competitiveness, Government 
intervention and Availability of resources. The Business competitiveness factor 
measures the microeconomic position of all businesses (small and medium-sized 
enterprises and large corporations) along such dimensions as productivity, efficiency 
and R&D&I. The other two factors describe the macroeconomic environment of the 
businesses, where the Government interventions consists of the regulation part and 
the Availability of resources the allocation part. 
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Table 3.4. The factors of the F-, O- and I-index 
F-index O-index I-index 
F1 Human capital O1 National 
goodwill 
I1 Business 
competitiveness 
Labour productivity (PPP)  
Overall productivity (PPP)  
Total health expenditure per 
capita  
Total public expenditure on 
education per capita  
Healthy life expectancy  
Total expenditure on R&D per 
capita 
Parallel economy  
Investment risk  
Image abroad  
Country credit rating  
Brain drain  
Risk of political 
instability  
Innovative capacity  
Productivity of companies  
Small and medium-size 
enterprises  
Information technology  
Large corporations 
 
F2 Accountable corporations O2 Investment 
conditions 
I2 Government 
intervention 
Ethical practices  
Social responsibility  
Credibility of managers  
Foreign investors  
Exchange rate stability  
Capital markets  
Investment incentives  
State ownership of 
enterprises 
Subsidies  
Finance and banking 
regulation  
Protectionism  
Legal and regulatory 
framework  
Ease of doing business  
Bureaucracy  
F3 Quality of the education 
system 
 I3 Availability of 
resources 
Educational assessment / 
Mathematics  
Educational assessment / Sciences  
Science in schools  
Educational system 
 
 Labour force  
Total primary energy 
supply per capita  
Burden of government 
regulation  
Employment rate  
Gross domestic savings 
F-index: KMO=0.823, explained proportion 76.4%; O-index: KMO=0.803, explained proportion 73.7%; 
I-index: KMO=0.791, explained proportion 73.408% 1. 
Source: own study. 
 
 
                                                     
1 The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) value helps in determining how suited our variables are to factor 
analysis. A KMO value above 0.8 means that the variables are highly suitable. Principal component 
analysis and Varimax rotation were used during the analysis. (To get a better understanding of the 
method see Varga & Szilágyi, 2011) 
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Forming Clusters 
The FOI-indices and the factors determined during the factor analysis were used to 
identify typical clusters within the OECD countries. These artificial clusters were 
created based on the values of the F-, O- , and I-index, with the so-called half-scale 
method. As the indices can have a value between 1 and 7, 4 is the mid-value. So all 
three indices were split into two groups: the values from 1 to 4 went into the group 
labelled as “low” (1), while the values above 4 were labelled as “high” (2). 
Theoretically all 8 clusters could represent feasible combinations, but most of 
the 34 OECD members fall into 4 groups (the distribution is shown in Table 3.5). 
In our interpretation these four groups of countries represent the development 
models within the OECD.  
The current chapter focuses on Group 3, which is called the dual model, 
representing the outward focused development strategy. As half-scaling was used as 
a method of clustering, it is obvious that the countries of Group 33 perform above 
average in their outside potential. A closer inspection of the factors shows, however, 
that these countries are especially strong in ensuring favourable Investment 
conditions, and their National goodwill (the other factor of the O-index) is below 
average. They are all characterised by liberalised capital flow regulations, exchange 
rate stability, accessible capital markets and incentive policies for investments. As far 
as the F-index is concerned, they perform poorly in the Quality of the education 
system and Human capital, while they are barely below average in the Accountable 
corporations factor. In the case of the I-index, the value of the Government 
intervention factor is slightly above average, although that cannot compensate for 
their weak performance in the other factors of Business competitiveness and 
Availability of resources. 
It is not difficult to spot a strong focus on outside resources in the factor 
structure of the third cluster. These countries create a favourable environment for the 
world market-oriented companies, and they adopt policies that lead to a more 
liberalised government regulation. For this reason their economies may be 
characterised with the classical dual structure: a competitive, outside-oriented sector 
that relies substantially on outside resources, and a traditional sector applying local 
capital that is at least partially isolated from the other sector. The main characteristic 
of the dual model therefore is a strong focus on attracting outside resources, with the 
help of which the economy can be modernised and a higher growth rate might be 
achieved. 
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Table 3.5. The clusters of OECD countries according to the half-scale method 
Group & 
Code 
Country 
1 (111) Greece, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Turkey 
3 (112) Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain 
5 (211) United Kingdom 
6 (212) Iceland 
7 (221) Belgium, France, Netherlands, Ireland, South Korea, New Zealand 
8 (222) Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United States 
The F-, O- and I-index values are indicated in brackets, where 1=countries with index values between 1 and 
4; 2=above 4. No countries fell into Groups 2 or 4. 
Source: own study. 
 
Figure 3.1. Position of Group 3 countries along the FOI dimensions 
Source: own study. 
 
F – index 2010
O – index 2010
I – index 2010 
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3.5. THE OUTWARD FOCUSED DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN V4 
Group 3 – the dual model implies a strategy that is focused on the attraction 
of outside resources. In other words we argue that if the goal is to move towards the 
dual model, the economic policy should concentrate on a strategy centred on the 
attraction of outside resources. If we draw a parallel between the development model 
(deducted from the clusters of countries) and the economic policy strategy, we can 
also tell which factors are most important for the outward focused strategy. We have 
seen that the third cluster exceeds in one of the outside factors, called Investment 
conditions, and in one of the inside ones, called Government intervention. These 
two will be the areas that the economic policy needs to address when the 
strengthening of the dual model is the goal. 
As a next step we checked which of the OECD members scored well in these 
two factors. In Investment conditions Ireland scores the highest, Austria is seventh, 
Finland and Denmark are eleventh and twelfth respectively; in Government 
intervention Finland is second, Denmark is fifth, Ireland is ninth and Austria 
is eleventh. Country studies were prepared of these four countries to detect those best 
practices that allowed them to excel in the areas measured by the two factors above. 
The country studies are fairly extensive and therefore cannot be included in the 
paper, but the lessons learned from them are featured in the final sections (the 
country studies are accessible in the Appendix of Bartha, Gubik & Tóthné Szita, 
2013). The final goal is to use the FOI analysis and the country studies to offer 
relevant policy recommendations for the Visegrad countries. 
Our suggestions were put forward using Williamson’s (1998) hierarchy (Table 
3.6). As the lowest level (L4) summarises the current issues of resource allocation, the 
actions listed here theoretically can have an instant effect on the economy. Economic 
policy measures may belong to this level as well, if we assume that changes in 
regulations, taxes or subsidies have an instant effect on the market behaviour of firms 
and individuals. The longer-term effect of central intervention is that persistent 
measures change the structure of the market and the economy, and the relationships 
among firms. These belong to the governance part of the economy (L3). The strategy 
focusing on the attraction of outside resources requires a predictable government, 
and that on the other hand requires the stability of the political system. That is why 
Level 2 is also present in Table 3.6, but it has to be said that changes on this level 
may take decades, according to Williamson. 
We shall start the presentation of our suggestions with those belonging to the 
highest level (L2). Because of the hierarchical system, the factors higher above are the 
prerequisites of anything below them. We have found that one of the pillars of best 
practice is the reliability of the economic policy. The corporate tax decrease policy in 
Ireland was started more than two decades ago, and it was consistently carried out; 
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the many decades of minority governments has led to a special culture of political 
consensus seeking in Denmark that makes it possible to carefully plan and fine-tune 
long- term social policies; the state is committed to long-term development goals in 
Austria and Finland. Political stability is coupled with the transparency of the public 
sector and a very low level of corruption in all cases. The latter two further enforce 
the reliability of economic policy, as they decrease the chance of interest groups 
capturing the state, and destabilising the policy making. 
Disciplined public finances are also an important part of the best practices. 
After the 2008 financial crisis it is clear that balanced budgets are important, but they 
seem to be an absolute must for a reliable investment environment. A stable budget 
position guarantees that the government does not have to take unexpected measures 
that affect company costs (e.g. tax raises or new taxes, withdrawing tax remedies, 
subsidies). 
The reliability of monetary policy, more particularly the reliability of exchange rate 
policy, is equally as important as that of fiscal policy. It is well known that exchange 
rate stability is a central element of the economic policy measures of open economies. 
The euro partially ensures that stability, although the exchange rate against other 
major currencies can still be very volatile. Because at least two-thirds of the trade of 
the European countries is conducted within Europe, the euro is able to provide 
a relative stability on the continent, and lets the member countries get rid of the best 
part of their exchange rate risks. 
The institutional framework that ensures the stability of the labour market was 
placed between Levels 2 and 3. Labour market issues are basically part of the 
allocation problem, so they should belong to Level 4. But it is also known that the 
pure market model is not an efficient one on the labour market, and usually there are 
dozens of institutional factors regulating it. This why the institutional framework of 
the labour market is higher up in Williamson’s hierarchy. In Austria and Denmark 
the collective bargaining system is completely integrated into the institutions of the 
central government, and therefore it is linked to Level 2, but it also has an effect on 
the governance of companies (L3), which is why it was put as a transition between 
the two levels. 
The dependency on the higher level structures is especially true of labour 
market institutions. More precisely, the Danish-Austrian type of social partnership 
and collective bargaining system can only be successful if the willingness to seek 
compromises and solidarity are an integral part of a country’s culture (factors 
belonging to L1 and L2). Hungary had experimented with the system in the 1990es, 
but gave up on it after several failures, so the suggestions on L2-L3 are only for the 
sake of comparison. Immediate action cannot be taken based on them. What is 
worth remembering is that long-term labour market stability is key to the  
outside-resources-oriented strategy, and this can only be achieved if  
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a well-functioning institutional framework is in place. Some areas require some sort 
of central regulation and planning: the smoothing of cyclical fluctuations  
(e.g. compensating for lost income in case of becoming unemployed); balancing 
structural weaknesses (e.g. the feedback of labour market needs to the education 
system). In other cases institutional guarantees may be needed to prevent the state 
from distorting the market (e.g. separating real wage changes from market powers). 
Table 3.6. Development areas for the strategy focused on the attraction of outside resources 
Level Component 
L2 Advanced political culture 
Low level of corruption 
Stable and foreseeable socio-economic environment 
Stable public finances 
Exchange rate stability – Eurozone membership 
L2-L3 
transition 
Social partnership in labour market affairs 
Collective agreement of employers and employees on national, sectorial 
and company level 
L3 Transparent government, e-government solutions 
Regulatory impact assessment – measuring the effects of government 
interventions 
L3-L4 
transition 
Persistently low corporate tax rate, with additional tax exemptions 
State of the art infrastructure 
Stable investment environment, coordinated tax and subsidy system 
Support for company-university-researcher cooperation  
L4 Clearly defined development goals: research and development, 
information and communication technologies 
Substantial state subsidies on corporate innovation  
Substantial central help for start-ups and export expansion, involving 
subsidies, information and counselling services, and business support 
agencies 
Low level of corporate tax rates 
Flexible labour market 
Source: own study. 
The second-order economising called governance by Williamson (L3) represents the 
efficiency of the government regulations in case of an economic policy analysis. This 
is important for the attraction of outside resources, because the administrative 
burdens of the bureaucracy increase the transaction costs of everyone, including the 
owners of foreign resources. The extent of transaction costs caused by the state 
therefore is a prime indicator of both capital investors and immigrants. Denmark and 
Finland are front runners in e-government solutions. These solutions provide huge 
advantages: e.g. they make bureaucracy more transparent, increase the speed at which 
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services can be provided by the state, make it easier to declare and pay taxes, and help 
in creating huge databases that make public policy decisions more reliable. 
Ireland is a great example for regulatory impact analysis. Stating from 2000 they 
gradually adopted the principle that the market distortion effects of government 
regulations are assessed. Basically a systematic attempt was made to quantify the 
transaction costs and changes in market behaviour caused by the intervention of the 
state. Thanks to the regulatory impact analysis the instruments that have the 
strongest market distortion effect may be filtered out, and the costs of both the state 
and the business sector can be decreased. The introduction of this approach has the 
added bonus of showing a more rational image of the bureaucracy, and making it 
look more attractive for investors. 
All of our other suggestions consist of economic policy measures that have 
a direct effect on the allocation of resources, and an instant impact on the economy, 
and so they belong to Level 4 (or to the transition between L3 and L4). The 
hierarchical structure still applies, of course; the lower-level suggestions can only 
work efficiently if they are compatible with the higher-level characteristics of the 
country. 
Ireland, Denmark and Austria have each set up a tax system where the relatively 
high overall tax burden is achieved with a low corporate tax rate (although the orders 
of magnitude are different: Ireland has one the lowest corporate tax rates in the 
world, its effective value is below 10%; the Danish is somewhat higher than the Irish, 
while the Austrian corporate tax rate can only be considered low if we compare it to 
the average of the developed welfare states). As the tax rate is a pivotal point in the 
investment decisions of the transnational companies, a consistently low corporate tax 
can be a great attraction. 
In all countries the state support for clusters is a main priority. Clusters usually 
involve the cooperation of companies, research institutes, universities, development 
agencies and risk capital firms, but they are also supported by the state. The practice 
of Denmark, Austria, Ireland or Finland shows that state support alone is not 
enough; the clusters may only be successful if they carry special knowledge that is 
competitive in the world market. Those industries are worth supporting that have 
traditionally performed well and whose main companies are well known on the 
world market (good examples for the Danish are food, pharmaceutics and wind 
energy, for the Finnish wood or information technology, for the Irish process 
innovation, and for the Austrians car manufacturing clusters). 
The flexible labour market is another attraction for transnational companies.  
If the termination of employment does not require a lot of administrative tasks, and 
can be carried out with relatively low costs, companies are able to adjust to the 
fluctuations in the world market demand. Denmark also has a social safety net, and 
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applies several active labour market instruments that ensure that the unemployed can 
find a new job relatively quickly.  
The suggestions in Table 3.6 will not only strengthen the model based on the 
attraction of outside resources, but the FOI analysis showed that they primarily affect 
the factors that are the pillars of such an economic policy orientation. The economic 
policy should concentrate on these instruments, if the main priority is the attraction 
of outside resources. 
3.6. CONCLUSIONS 
Group 3 detected with the FOI model can be characterised as an outward focused 
development path, a development strategy based on the attraction of outside 
resources. Countries choosing this as a priority try to create an internal business and 
regulation environment that will make them attractive to outside investors. The more 
attractive environment may encourage the inflow of outside resources, which are 
needed because the local capital and knowledge generation is not sufficient. Many 
historical examples confirm that such a development strategy can prove successful, 
but the global environment has its risks as well. On the one hand overreliance on 
outside resources can result in a dependent position, because the sudden withdrawal 
of resources may lead to the collapse of the economy. The dependent position on the 
other hand can push the country toward an institutional environment favouring 
outside agents to the local ones – a process that further strengthens the exposure of 
the country. 
Most of the policy recommendations suggested in the chapter generally favour 
local corporations as well as foreign-owned or foreign-based ones. The outward focus 
of a country’s development strategy therefore should help local enterprises in 
becoming more competitive. Yet, this strategy usually result in a dual structure, 
where a good portion of the local businesses are characterised with low level of 
competitiveness, and have very little chance of going international. Our 
recommendations are based on the best practices of the countries where this dual 
structure phenomenon cannot be detected. Therefore the long term success of the 
outward focused strategy is dependent on additional economic policy instruments 
that can adequately address the problems derived from the dual structure of the 
economy and the society. 
The hierarchy presented in Figure 3.1 shows that careful consideration of 
instruments is needed before any steps are taken, because positive outcomes can only 
be expected from economic policy measures that are in harmony with the 
institutional framework of the country. Instruments requiring institutional elements 
higher up the hierarchy, often fail for this reason. 
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